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THE REASONABLE SUSPICION TEST OF NORTHERN
IRELAND'S EMERGENCY LEGISLATION: A VIOLATION
OF THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS
Elizabeth Kondongakost
INTRODUCTION
As the leader of the political wing of the Irish Republican
Army (IRA), Gerry Adams' primary hope for Northern Ireland is to
receive England's guarantee to protect the people of Northern
Ireland's basic human and civil rights, Catholics and revolutionaries
included.! Adams' demand for this guarantee is the latest event in the
long, violent strife between Great Britain and Northern Ireland. This
longlasting struggle for Irish independence and unity began in 1610,
when King James I of Britain encouraged Scottish Presbyterians and
English Episcopalians to settle in Ireland on confiscated lands as a
means of ensuring the region's loyalty to the crown.2 A conflict
between the two countries has existed ever since.3
I. Focus: PRETRIAL RESTRICTIONS ON THE NORTHERN IRISH
This article focuses on the pretrial restrictions which the
Northern Ireland (Emergency Provisions) Act (Provisions)4 and The
Prevention of Terrorism (Temporary Provisions) Act (PTA)5 impose
t J.D. Temple University School of Law; Associate Editor of the Temple Journal of
International Law and Comparative Law Journal 1995.
' Tracy L. Miller, Geny Adams' Visionfor a New Ireland, UNITED PRESS, Sept. 29,
1994.
2 James T. Kelly, The Empire Strikes Back: The Taking of Joe Doherty, 61
FoRDHAM IN"LL.J. 317,320 (1992).3 1d.
4 Northern Ireland (Emergency Provisions) Act, 1991, ch. 24, (Eng.) [hereinafter the
Provisions.]
' The Prevention of Terrorism (Temporary Provisions) Act, 1989, ch. 4, (Eng).
[hereinafter the PTA.]
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upon the individual liberties of Northern Irish citizens. For example,
both the Provisions and the PTA empower police officers
in Northern Ireland to arrest citizens, with or without a warrant,6 if
they have reasonable suspicion that the citizen is involved in terrorist
activity.7 The officer may effectuate the arrest by conducting a
6 Id. at § 14, The Provisions, supra note 4, § 17.
7 The Provisions, supra note 4, §§ 17, 18; The PTA, supra note 5, § 14(1)(b).
§ 17 of the Provisions reads as follows:
CONSTABLE'S GENERAL POWER OF ARREST AND SEIZURE
(1) Any constable may arrest without warrant any person who he has reasonable
grounds to suspect is committing, has committed or is about to commit a
scheduled offense or an offense under this Act which is not a scheduled offense.
(2) For the purpose of arresting a person under this section a constable may enter
and search any premises or other place where that person is or where the
constable has reasonable grounds for suspecting him to be.
(3) A constable may seize anything which he has reasonable grounds to suspect
is being, has been or is intended to be used in the commission of a scheduled
offence or an offence under this Act which is not a scheduled offense.
§ 18 of the Provisions reads as follows:
POWERS OF ARREST AND SEIZURE BY MEMBERS OF HER MAJESTY'S
FORCES
(1) Any member of Her Majestys forces on duty may arrest without warrant, and
detain for not more than four hours, a person who he has reasonable grounds to
suspect is committing, has committed or is about to commit any offence.
(2) A person effecting an arrest under this section complies with any rule of law
requiring him to state the ground of arrest if he states that he is effecting the arrest
as a member of Her Majesty's forces.
(3) For the purpose of arresting a person under this section a member of Her
Majesty's forces may enter and search any premises or other place-
(a) where that person is, or
(b) if there are reasonable grounds for suspecting that that person is a
terrorist or has committed an offense involving the use or possession of an
explosive substance or firearm, where there are reasonable grounds for
suspecting him to be.
(4) Any member of Her Majesty's forces may seize, and detain for not more than
four hours, anything which he has reasonable grounds to suspect is being, has
been or is intended to be used in the commission of an offense.
§ 14(l)(b) of the PTA reads:
ARREST AND DETENTION OF SUSPECTED PERSONS
(1) Subject to subsection (2) below [defining acts of terrorism], a constable may
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warrantless search of any premises where he believes the suspect is
located." As a result, warrantless and groundless arrests have the
potential to occur very often.
This article first discusses the general limits on personal
liberties that the emergency legislation imposes upon the people of
Northern Ireland, followed by an analysis of the role of the European
Court of Human Rights (ECHR) in protecting these rights through
Article 5(1)(c)9 of the European Convention of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms (Convention).10 The second section discusses
the ECHR's recent decisions regarding the reasonable suspicion
standard of the Provisions. It also addresses the PTA and explains the
ECHRs definition of what constitutes reasonable suspicion. The lack
arrest without warrant a person whom he has reasonable grounds for suspecting
to be.
(b) a person who is or has been concerned in the commission, preparation
or instigation of acts of terrorism to which this section applies.
8 This power has been called "one of the most offensive provisions in the entire
situation." C. RicE, DVDED IRELAND- A CAUSE FOR AMERICAN CONCERN 24 (1985);
The Provisions, supra note 4, § 16; the PTA, supra note 5, § 14 (Supp 1993).
§ 16 of the Provisions reads:
ENTRY AND SEARCH OF PREMISES FOR PURPOSE OF ARRESTING
TERRORISTS
For the purpose of arresting a person under section 14(1)(b) of the Prevention of
Terrorism (Temporary Provisions) Act 1989 (arrest of persons suspected of
being concerned in acts of terrorism) a constable may enter and search any
premises or other place where that person is or where the constable has
reasonable grounds for suspecting him to be.
9 Article 5 of the Convention reads:
(1) Everyone has the right to liberty and security of person.
No one shall be deprived of his liberty save in the following cases and in
accordance with a procedure prescribed by law:
(q) the lawful arrest or detention of a person effected for the purpose of
bringing him before the competent legal authority on reasonable suspicion of
having committed an offence or when it is reasonably considered necessary to
prevent his committing an offence of fleeing after having done so.
European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms, Nov. 4, 1950, Europ. T.S. No. 5, art. 5(l)(c) (1953) [hereinafter the
Convention.]
10 Id.
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of safeguards available to protect the personal liberties of the people
of Northern Ireland will then be discussed and will stress the need for
ECHR intervention to resolve Northern Ireland's particular problems.
The final section of this article examines the possible effects of
the enforcement of a favorable ECHR decision. A decision strongly
rebuking England may not have the effect of domestic law, but may
still in fact lead to significant changes. This prospect is evidenced by
the effects in England of earlier negative decisions by the ECHR.
Lastly, England's state of emergency defense will be discussed,
revealing the excuse to be ruinous in the face of international law.
A. A Brief History of Northern Ireland
As a political entity, Northern Ireland was born out of the First
World War." Following the war, the IRA led a guerilla campaign,
causing the British Parliament to conclude that autonomy for Ireland
was in Great Britain's best interest." The Parliament's solution was a
partition of the island into two parts. 13 The partition granted twenty-
six counties independence within the British Commonwealth in the
form of dominion status, to be collectively known as the Irish Free
State.14 "This overwhelmingly Catholic state adopted a new
Constitution in 1937 and subsequently left the British Commonwealth,
becoming the Republic of Ireland."15
"Parliament established six remaining counties, part of the
historic northern province of Ulster, as a self-governing unit within the
" Martin Flaherty, Human Rights Violations Against Defense Lawyers: The Case
Against Northern Ireland, 7 HARv. HuM. RTS. J. 87, 93 (1994).
12 Id.
13 Id.
14 The Republic is comprised of the counties of Carlow, Dublin, Kildare, Kilkenny,
Laoighis, Louth, Longford, Meath, Offaly, Westmeath, Wexford, Wicklow, Clare,
Cork, Kerry, Waterford, Limerick, Tipperary, Galway, Leitrim, Mayo, Roscommon,
Sligo, Cavan, Donegal and Monaghan. Id.
15 Id.
1996]
103 BUFFALO JOURNAL OFINTERNATIONAL LAW [Vol.3
United Kingdom."16 The Northern Ireland Parliament began operation
in 1922, and eventually became known as "Stormont.'0 7 For fifty
years, Stormont exercised jurisdiction over all governmental functions
except for taxation and defense.1 8  Protestant politicians
overwhelmingly controlled Stormont. 9 With this uncontrolled
majority power, the Stormont's Protestant leaders consistently used its
majority power to pursue discriminatory policies against Catholics in
employment, housing and voting rights.2" Much of the Catholic
populace "either could not or would not participate in Northern
,,21Ireland's governance.
This non-violent resistance led to mild protests, which
eventually escalated to violence.' The IRA, dormant since 1922,
resurfaced and loyal paramilitary groups reappeared as well.' The
British deployed troops to respond to the ever-increasing violent
situation in August 1969 and have remained in Northern Ireland ever
since.24
The conflict culminated with the British Parliament's
enactment of the Northern Ireland (Emergency Provisions) Act of
1972 (Provisions). 5 Emergency legislation has governed Northern
Ireland since its creation.26 Legislative developments framed the
United Kingdom's "response to political violence, radically altering
'1 Id Northern Ireland is comprised of the counties of Antrim, Londonderry, Tyrone,
Fermanagh, Armagh and Down.
17 Id.
18 Id.
19 Id.
20 Id.
21 Id.
2 Id. at 94.
23 Id.
24 Id.
z Northern Ireland (Emergency Provisions) Act, 1973, ch. 53, (Eng.).
z Flaherty, supra note 1I, at 96. "Such legislation began with the Civil Authorities
(Special Powers) Act (Northern Ireland) in 1922, which itself replaced the Restoration
of Order Act of 1920."
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previously settled criminal processes."27 In March 1972, as Northern
Ireland's violence peaked with 467 political fatalities, "Britain
suspended parliamentary government within Northern Ireland."2
Great Britain originally intended the suspension as a temporary
measure.29 The resulting system of direct rule, however, with the
English government administering Northern Ireland from London,
remains Northern Ireland's governing framework.30 The British
Parliament also enacted several pieces of emergency legislation that
radically altered Northern Ireland's criminal justice system.3" The
British Parliament renewed the two major acts subsequently since their
creation and are still in effect today.32
The first direct act of Parliament is the Northern Ireland
(Emergency Provisions) Act (Provisions) of 1991, which replaces the
earlier Provisions passed in 1972, 1975, 1978 and 1987.3" The second
is the Prevention of Terrorism (Temporary Provisions) Act (PTA) of
1989, which follows upon the earlier Prevention of Terrorism acts
enacted in 1974, 1976 and 1984.' While the Provisions apply only to
Northern Ireland, the PTA operates throughout the United
Kingdom.35
The Provisions are a direct result of the recommendations of
the Diplock Commission, 36 a commission created to consider legal
27 Id. at 95.
' Id. at 94; Kelly, supra note 2, at 325.
29 Kelly, supra note 2, at 325.
30 Id.
31 Id.
3' The Provisions, supra note 4; The PTA, supra note 5.
33 The Provisions, supra note 4; The PTA, supra note 5; Flaherty, supra note 11, at
95.
34 Flaherty, supra note 11, at 95.
35 Id.
' Charles Carlton, Judging Without Consensus: The Diplock Courts in Northern
Ireland, L. & POL'Y Q. 225, 230 (April 1981). Prime Minister Heath of Great
Britain appointed Lord Justice Diplock, one of their most prominent jurists, to head
the commission, after he realized that the province's courts were unable to deal with
the increased level of violence. Id.
1996]
105 BUFFALO JOURNAL OFINTERNATIONAL LAW [Vol. 3
procedures to deal with terrorist activities in Northern Ireland.37 The
Provisions have been described as "the most Draconian measure[s] to
be put before Parliament at Westminster."38 These Provisions, along
with the PTA, constitute the basis for the level of personal rights and
freedoms the citizens of Northern Ireland possess today.
39
B. Restrictions on Personal Liberty
Both the Provisions and the PTA impose procedural and
substantive restrictions on individual liberty in Northern Ireland, with
the purpose of preventing terrorist activity in both countries. The two
acts work in tandem to form a system designed to garner easier
convictions." Together, these two provisions allow, inter alia, a
police officer or army personnel to make a warrantless arrest, as well
as search and seize possessions based on the security officer's
reasonable suspicion4' that the person is a terrorist.42
The Provisions grant security forces further powers of arrest
where they suspect non-terrorist criminal activity.43 Police officers,
unlike army personnel, have the right to seize anything they find
during their warrantless search if they believe the object to be
connected to a crime.' All of these situations require a very low
standard of suspicion for a police or army officer to arrest, search and
3' W.L. Twining, Emergency Powers and the Criminal Process: The Diplock
Report, 1973 CIuM. L. REv. 406 (1973).
38 Id. at 407.
3' Kelly D. Talcott, Questions of Justice: U.S. Courts' Powers of Inquiry Under
Article 3(a) of the United States-United Kingdom Supplementary Extradition Treaty,
62 No=R DAME L. REv. 474,478 (1987).
40 Flaherty, supra note 11, at 95.
41 The Provisions, supra note 4, § 16; The PTA, supra note 5, § 14. ("reasonable
grounds for suspecting" requires not only that the person in question has reasonable
grounds for'suspecting, but also that he actually does suspect).
42 The Provisions, supra note 4, §§ 16-18; The PTA, supra note 5, § 14.
13 The Provisions, supra note 4, § 17; Talcott, supra note 39, at 480.
44 The Provisions, supra note 4, § 17(3).
REASONABLE SUSPICION TEST
seize a suspect and his possessions.45 The officer bases his suspicion
on his subjective belief, with the result that almost any Irish citizen is
susceptible to arbitrary arrests, searches and seizures at any time.46
Catholic Northern Irish political leaders and civilians have
historically protested that the low standard of reasonable grounds
required of the English domestic police and military, results in
arbitrary criminal procedures.47 They claim that these procedures
violate basic human rights afforded by international law.48 To ensure
basic human rights for the people of Northern Ireland, including the
right to be free from arbitrary arrests, searches and seizures, Great
Britain has the option to willingly review and repeal the emergency
legislation. Many Catholic Irish political leaders and non-partisan civil
rights groups recently called for England to roll back its emergency
powers.49 However, with the current wave of conservatism pervading
the British political climate it was highly unlikely that they would
repeal the emergency legislation.5" For example, Parliament
responded in 1994 to public pressure to take a tougher stance toward
criminals by passing the Criminal Justice and Public Order Bill, a pro-
law enforcement bill that went into effect in Spring 1995.51 However,
Northern Ireland is not without legal recourse. An alternative to the
voluntary repeal of the Provisions and the PTA may be found in the
power of the Convention.52
" Flaherty, supra note 11, at 95.
46 Id.
4' British Abusing Rights, Sinn Fien Leader Says, THE RECORD (BERGEN), October
6, 1994, at A28.
49 Id.
41 Jim Cusack, Rolling Back "Emergency" Powers with Origins in Mid-Eighteenth
Century, THE IRISH Tums, October 18, 1994, at 6; Richard Norton-Taylor & Duncan
Campbell, Liberty Calls for Human Rights 'Peace Dividend', THE GuARDIAN,
September 3, 1994, at 4; Dick Grogan, Call for Emergency Legislation to be
Repealed, North and South, THE IRISH TIMEs, September 9, 1994, at 7.
" Michael Zander, Silence Isn't Just for Crooks, THE TIMEs (LONDON), August 20,
1994 at
51 Id.
" The Convention, supra note 9 and accompanying text.
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C. Pretrial Restriction Cases In Recent ECHR History
The Convention guarantees the citizens of its signatory states
the protection of their basic, fundamental human rights as defined by
international law. 3 The United Kingdom has recognized and has
agreed to respect those rights and freedoms listed in the Convention."
The ECHR may conduct hearings regarding violations of the
Convention. 5 A state party may refer a violation to the ECHR and
most states accept the right of individuals to sue governments for a
breach of the Convention. 6 The ECHR's decisions are binding,
although the degree of the force of the law depends on the particular
country. 7
Recently, the ECHR ruled on whether England's pretrial
actions toward citizens of Northern Ireland violated the Convention. 8
Specifically, citizens petition the Court to adjudicate instances whether
England's actions violated Article 5(1)(c) of the Convention, which
guarantees a person's right to liberty except when the lawful arrest is
" Jane S. Jensen, The Impact of the European Convention for the Protection of
Human Rights on National Law, 52 U. CIN. L. REv. 760 (1983).
5 Talcott, supra note 39, at 485.
5 Charles Lysaght, The Scope of Protocol !! and its Relation to Common Article 3
of the Geneva Conventions of 1949 and other Human Rights Instruments, 33 AMER.
U. L. REv. 9, 16 (1983).
56 Id.
57 Member states have the option of recognizing the jurisdiction of the ECHR as
compulsory, pursuant to Article 46 of the Convention. Jensen, supra note 53, at 762
& n.8. Most countries have done so. Id. Article 46 of the Convention provides:
(1) Any of the High Contracting Parties may at any time declare that it
recognizes as compulsory ipso facto and without special agreement the
jurisdiction of the Court in all matters concerning the interpretation and
application of the present Convention.
(2) The declarations referred to above may be made unconditionally or
on condition of reciprocity on the part of several or certain other High
Contracting Parties or for a specified period.
Convention, supra note 9, art. 46.
58 Fox, Campbell and Hartley v. United Kingdom, 13 Eur. Ct. H.R. Rep. at 157
(1991); Murray v. United Kingdom, 19 Eur. Ct. H.R. Rep. at 193 (1995).
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based upon reasonable suspicion. 9 The ECHR found such a violation
in the 1990 case of Fox, Campbell and Hartley v. United Kingdom'
in which the British police detained and arrested three men under
suspicion of being terrorists.6" The Court was unconvinced by the
reasons cited by England to satisfy its reasonable suspicion standard.62
Most recently, in Murray v. United Kingdom,63 the ECLR ruled that
British troops acted within the law when they arrested a Belfast
woman suspected of fundraising for the IRA under the 1978
Provisions.' At the time, the Provisions only called for a "sincere and
authentic" military suspicion; whereas, today the Provisions require a
standard of reasonable suspicion.65 The ECHR in effect issued the
message to the United Kingdom that an even lower standard than
reasonable suspicion is acceptable to arrest Northern Irish citizens."
While these two cases are factually analogous, it appears that the
ECHR came to two different conclusions on the same issue of
reasonable suspicion: in Fox, the ECHR found that the arrests were
unjustified67, while in Murray the ECBR held that the arrest was
within Article 5(1)(c).6" These issues will be explained and discussed
in more detail in the following sections.
'- The Convention, supra note 9, art.5(l)(c); Murray, 19 Eur. Ct. H.R. Rep. at 193
(1995).
60 Fox, 13 Eur. Ct. H.R. Rep. at 1567.
61 Id.
62 Id. at 29-32.
6 Murray, 19 Eur. Ct. HR. Rep. at 193.
A Id.
65 Northern Ireland (Emergency Provisions) Act, 1978, ch. 5, § 14.
6 Fox, 13 Eur. CL HR. Rep. at 157.
6 Id. at 29-32.
6 Murray, 19 Eur. Ct. HR. Rep. at 193.
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subsequent search and seizure at any point."6 The military and
paramilitary forces are in effect their own judge and jury on whether
the arrest was founded on reasonable suspicion or otherwise, since the
law does not require a warrant."" The citizens of Northern Ireland
are left to argue their case in court after the event in question took
place, with the burden of proof falling on them.162 The burden of
proof rests solely on the petitioner to disprove that the officers had a
good faith reasonable suspicion to arrest.'63 Furthermore, the ECHR
has set forth a confusing standard by which the domestic courts are
supposed to judge the reasonableness of the arrest.' This unclear
mandate can only serve to hinder potential petitioners.
Second, the fact that few arrests result in charges being
filed,,6 as in Fox,"' demonstrates that the security forces abuse the
arrest powers granted by the EPA and infringe on the Northern Irish
citizens' civil rights in the process. 67 Unfortunately, periodic arrest
and interrogation is a fact of life for many Northern Irish citizens.'68
The fact that these periodic arrests rarely result in charges being filed
illustrates that the arrests further the objective of suppression and
intimidation and not of efficient law enforcement. 69
Finally, the ECHR needs to come to a clear and stringent
decision rebuking the British for their standard for determining
reasonableness because a strong decision may protect the Northern
'6 The Provisions, supra note 4, §§ 16-18; the PTA, supra note 5, § 14.
1 The Provisions, supra note 4, §§ 16-18; the PTA, supra note 5, § 14.
' See generaly Fox, 13 Eur. Ct. H.R. Rep. at 157 (199 1)(stating that the petitioner
must disprove the existence of reasonable suspicion); Murray, 19 Eur. Ct. H.R. Rep.
at 193 (1995).
163 Fox, 13 Eur. CL H.R. Rep. at 157 (1991); Murray, 19 Eur. Ct. H.R. Rep. at
193 (1995).
164 See generally Fox, 13 Eur. CL H.R. Rep. at 157 (discussing the inconsistency
between the ECHR's decisions in Fox and Murray).
65 Talcott, supra note 39, at 481.
16 Fox,13 Eur. Ct. H.R. Rep. at 157.
"a Talcott, supra note 39, at 481.
168 Id.
169 Id.
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Irish citizens against the mentality that pervades the police and
security forces of Northern Ireland. The security forces in Northern
Ireland completely control the inhabitants of the country. One could
conclude that the British forces are manipulating the rules of the
Convention in order to intimidate and suppress the citizens of
Northern Ireland, supposedly their own people.
IV. SCOPE AND IMPACT OF A FAVORABLE DECISION BY THE
ECHR
There is no question that the Convention, because it is a treaty,
is binding on those states that have ratified it.' 70 The United Kingdom
is one of those states.1 7' The United Kingdom has agreed to protect
and respect these freedoms listed in the convention.'72
The relationship of the Convention to the domestic law of
England is the focus of this section. If the ECHR was to reach a
favorable decision, mandating that England must raise its reasonable
suspicion standard in order to protect Northern Irish citizens, the next
query becomes how England would implement this decision into their
domestic law. The question presented is whether legislative
implementation of an ECHR directive is feasible in order to enforce an
ECHR decision as domestic law.
The domestic courts in the United Kingdom do not view the
Convention as automatically applicable to their jurisdiction. 73 Rather,
the United Kingdom requires additional action for the Convention to
have the force of municipal law. 74 To date, such action has not been
taken in the United Kingdom.'75 Thus, the next inquiry focuses on the
legislative prong of domestic law. Legislative implementation of an
170 Jensen, supra note 53, at 773.
7 Talcott, supra note 39, at 485.
172 Id.
'" Jensen, supra note 53, at 774.
174 Id.
175 Id..
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ECHR directive would be a more feasible route to take.
The Convention is likely to have its greatest impact upon the
legislature rather than upon the courts. 76 Many judges are not
familiar with the Convention and do not accept the ECHR rulings as
binding upon them. 7 As a result, applying human rights principles
via the legislature will generally have a greater impact upon national
law.178 Furthermore, governments must coordinate their particular
statutory law with the Convention when they first become signatories,
because the Convention requires governments to review the applicable
legislation and explicitly seek exemption from any provision of the
Convention which conflicts with their domestic laws. 79
Instances of legislative modification in the United Kingdom as
a result of decisions under the Convention exist. These instances
include the 1973 ruling that the United Kingdom had violated the
rights of thirty one East African Asians under Article 3 of the
Convention."' The ruling caused the British government to liberalize
its immigration quotas to allow all thirty-one individuals to migrate to
the United Kingdom.' These changes caused England to declare this
issue closed in 1977.18
176 Id.
177 Id.
178 Id.
'" Id at 776; See also The Convention, supra note 8, at art. 64. Pursuant to Article
64, "any state may, when signing this Convention or when deposing its instrument of
ratification, make a reservation in respect of any particular provision of the Convention
to the extent that any law then in force in its territory is not in conformity with the
provision."
"W The report of the Human Rights Commission in the East African Asians case has
never been published officially, but extracts of the report are published in 3 Eur. H.
R. Rep. 76, 77 (1981). Article 3 reads, "No one shall be subjected to torture or to
inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment," The Convention, supra note 8, art.
3.
,8 Jensen, supra note 53, at 777; See 1971 Y.B. Eur. Cony. on H.R. 956 (debate in
Parliament concerning immigration control problems caused by the Court's decision
in East African Asians cases).
'1 Jensen, supra note 53, at 777; Committee of Ministers, Resolution DH(77)2, 1977
Y.B. Eur. Conv. on H.R. 642 (Oct. 21, 1977).
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The ECHR decided in the 1975 case Golder v. United
Kingdom' that the United Kingdom had violated Articles 6(1) and
8 of the Convention by restricting communications between a detained
person and his lawyer.'84 This decision led the British government to
abolish such restraints.'85 The United Kingdom also amended its
marriage laws as a result of two complaints from prisoners whose
right to marry while in jail had been denied.'86 Finally, the mere threat
of a court case led to a negotiated settlement between Great Britain
and Greece." 7 The British government repealed certain ordinances
relating to Cyprus, ordinances the Greek government protested in the
first two interstate applications presented to the ECHR in May 1956
and July 1957.8
These past instances of legislative modification seem to
' 1975 Y.B. Eur. Cony. on H.R. 290.
'u Id.; The Convention, supra note 9, arts. 6(1), 8. Article 6(1) provides:
In the determination of his civil rights and obligations or of any criminal
charge against him, everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a
reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal established by law.
Judgement shall be pronounced publicly, but the press and public may be
excluded from all or part of the trial in the interests of morals, public order or
national security in a democratic society, where the interests ofjuveniles or the
protection of the private life of the parties to require, or to the extent strictly
necessary in the opinion of the court in special circumstances where publicity
would prejudice the interests ofjustice.
Article 8 provides:
(1) Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his home and
his correspondence.
(2) There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of this
right except such as in accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic
society in the interests of national security, public safety or the economic well-
being of the country, for the prevention of disorder and crime, for the protection
of health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.
's Jensen, supra note 53, at 778.
I86 d.; Draper v. United Kingdom, 1981 Y.B. Eur. Cony. on H.R. 462; Hamer v.
United Kingdom, 1981 Y.B. Eur. Cony. on H.R. 464.
's Jensen, supra note 53, at 778.
' Jensen, supra note 53, at 778; Greece v. United Kingdom, No. 176/56 (1956), and
No. 299/57 (1957) (state applications).
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provide hope that England would change their practices and standards
of the Provisions if the ECHR so mandated. However, a problem still
lies in the enforcement of the Court's mandate. For example, in
Ireland v. United Kingdom," the Court held that the combined use of
certain interrogation techniques by United Kingdom officials on
Northern Irish citizens suspected of IRA activities, constituted a
breach of Article 3 of the Convention.'" However, no charges were
ever brought against those responsible. ' 91 The ECHR held that it had
no power to direct the United Kingdom to institute criminal or
disciplinary proceedings against those members of the security forces
who had committed the breaches of Article 3 and against those who
tolerated or condoned such a breach.'" Thus, it could follow that the
ECHR may rule against Great Britain, but may not initiate any
enforcement procedures against the violators of Article 5.
Strong support exists for a change in the standards, although
one could argue that the United Kingdom has an incredible stake in
keeping the standard an inferior one. Its great flexibility in carrying
out the arrests and subsequent searches and seizures is apt to comprise
a tremendous amount of its power in being the dominant force
between itself and the IRA. To give up this weapon could
compromise its position of power. Therefore, by maintaining its
power base of intimidation as its motivation, it is very unlikely that the
British Parliament would sanction or initiate any change in the
Provisions.
On the other hand, the United Kingdom has changed the
standards in the past, as the ECHR discussed in Fox and Murray.93
The ECHR raised the standard in 1987 from a genuine and honestly
" 1978 Y.B. Eur. Cony. on H.R. 602.
190 Id.
"'1 Lysaght, supra note 55, at 17.
"2 Id. at 18.
" See generally Euro Rights Court Upholds Britain on Northern Ireland, THE
REUTER EUROPEAN COMMuNrrY REPORT, Oct. 28, 1994 (analyzing the ECHR's
decision in Murray).
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held suspicion to a reasonable suspicion standard.' 94 In addition,
Great Britain changed their interrogation techniques, the techniques
so criticized in Ireland v. United Kingdom, due to public pressure.'95
Furthermore, on August 31, 1994 the IRA declared a cease fire to all
the terrorist activity.' 6 Gerry Adams has toured the United States
since, gathering support for his peace plan among both American
citizens and politicians.197 Thus, great international pressure from
America and its allies may provide England with some incentive to
change its laws.
Additionally, the peace plan itself could be perceived as
evidence itself that such stringent laws are no longer necessary.
Under the standards of the Convention, an emergency situation has
existed in Northern Ireland since 1957.19 The existence of a
protracted state of emergency in Northern Ireland has, in the eyes of
the ECHR, justified the United Kingdom's breaches of the Convention
in the years since 1957.199 However, the fact that the emergency
situation is now in its thirty-eighth year suggests that which was once
an emergency has now become the status quo.2" As a result, the
Parliament of the United Kingdom cannot use the excuse of an
emergency situation anymore to delay advancements and continue
infringing on the civil rights of the people of Northern Ireland.
194 Id.
195 Lysaght, supra note 55, at 17.
19 See Francis Costello, Many Miles to Peace in Ireland; Cease-fire only the End of
the Beginning, THE BOSTON HERALD, Sept. 18, 1994, at 27 (discussing the potential
for peace in Northern Ireland).
197 See Miller, supra note I (explaining Gerry Adams' methods of garnering
international support for the IRA's peace plan).
198 Talcott, supra note 39 at 490 & n. I 11. "On July 15, 1957, the government of
Northern Ireland put into force extraordinary powers to secure public peace and order.
The Secretary-General of the Council of Europe was informed of these measures by
a letter dated July 20, 1957."
"' Lawless v. Ireland, 3 Eur. Ct.. H.R. (ser. A) (1976). The Court held that the
internment practiced in the Lawless case appeared to be a "measure strictly required
by the exigencies of the situation". Id. at 59; Talcott, supra note 39, at 490 & n. 112.
20 Talcott, supra note 39, at 490.
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1994 was an extraordinary year for Northern Ireland. All eyes
remain on Northern Ireland to live up to the promise of lasting peace.
The IRA's change in approach to the conflict between Great Britain
and Northern Ireland could be the occasion that England needs to
prompt a complete review of all Northern Irish emergency legislation.
A review of emergency powers would illustrate a renewed
commitment to human rights in Northern Ireland. This review has not
occurred as of yet.
Failure to acknowledge and protect the rights of Northern
Irish citizens led to 25 years of war.2" ' The government of Great
Britain cannot espouse its protection of inalienable individual human
rights when its own citizens in Northern Ireland are being subjected
to arbitrary arrests, searches and seizures.20 2 When confronted,
England has invoked the circumstances of the Northern Ireland
conflict for excuses and the ECHR has accepted that reason.20 3
The United Kingdom uses terrorism as a justification for the
imposition of draconian powers in Northern Ireland, and the ECHR
has accepted this defense.20' The IRA has now initiated a cease fire,
however.2" If the cease fire holds, the political climate could change,
no longer the climate that made it difficult to oppose any aspect of
anti-terrorist legislation.
The ECHR cannot claim ignorance when confronted with
evidence that the reasonable suspicion standard of the United
Kingdom's emergency provisions violates the mandates of a
Convention it ratified.20 6 However, the ECHR is wavering between
protecting Northern Irish citizens' rights or protecting Britain's
201 Flaherty, supra note 11.
202 Talcott, supra note39, at 481.
203 Supra note 199 and accompanying text.
204 Supra note 199 and accompanying text.
205 Costello, supra note 196.
20" Bassiouni, supra note 83.
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military power while innocent people on the streets of Northern
Ireland pay for the Court's indecisiveness.
Article 19 of the Convention creates a European Court of
Human Rights to "ensure the observance of the engagements
undertaken by the High Contracting Parties in the present
Convention.""0 7 This present Court is reneging on that duty. Since
ECHR decisions are binding upon England, a decision criticizing
England and ordering a change in their standards could likely result
in some change in Great Britain."' The combined factors of
international pressure,2" the IRA's apparent willingness to work for
a lasting peace,"0 and the legislature's obligation to follow the
directives of the Court will all work together to ensure fundamental
human rights in Northern Ireland. 21
The leaders of Great Britain and Northern Ireland have
earnestly agreed to reach an agreement on the political future of
Northern Ireland.22 In the meantime, before a final solution regarding
Northern Ireland is reached, the ECHR has the chance to contribute
to the ending of centuries of violence between these two cultures.
More importantly, it has the opportunity to ensure the fundamental
human rights assured to all world citizens to the people of Northern
Ireland. The potential for lasting peace that presently exists gives the
ECHR the perfect opportunity to make an ultimate decision protecting
the human rights of the citizens of Northern Ireland. The moment the
very name of Ireland is mentioned, the English seem to bid adieu to
common feeling, common prudence, and common sense, and to act
with the barbarity of tyrants, and the fatuity of idiots.1 3
207 The Convention, supra note 9, at art. 19.
208 Supra notes 170-172 and accompanying text.
20 Miller, supra note 1.
2,0 Costello, supra note 196.
21 Supra notes 176-179 and accompanying text.
21 William Miller, British, Irish Agree to Speed Party Talks; Move Centers on
Laying Groundwork, THE BOSTON GLOBE, Dec. 21, 1994, at 20.
213 SYDNEY SMITH, THE LETTERS OF PETER PLYMLEY (Ayer 1972) (1929).
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